In PNAS, Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff (1) describe two collaborations of psychologists and economists in which they made the central contributions by psychologists. In both cases, the objective was to design survey questions that measure in probabilistic terms the expectations that individuals hold for future events. They judged both collaborations successful. They offer four reasons: "(i) having a shared research goal, which neither discipline could achieve on its own; (ii) finding common ground in shared methodology, which met each discipline's essential evidentiary conditions, but without insisting on its culturally acquired tastes; (iii) sharing the effort throughout, with common language and sense of ownership; and (iv) gaining mutual benefit from both the research process and its products."
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I was an economist collaborator on both projects. I agree with their positive assessment and with the reasons they cite.
Readers may ask why an article recounting successful collaborations between psychologists and economists warrants publication in PNAS. After all, study of human behavior is a common core concern of both disciplines. Hence, one might expect that productive collaborative research would occur often. However, projects such as Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff (1) describe have been rare, making their article noteworthy. Interactions between psychologists and economists have been marked more by conflict than by collaboration. Interactions of any kind have been less common than disconnect, with researchers in each discipline going their own way.
Two factors may explain why conflict and disconnect rather than collaboration have characterized the relationship between psychologists and economists. First, researchers in these disciplines have largely distinct objectives. Second, they use largely distinct research methods.
Psychologists view judgment and decision as subjects of intrinsic interest. They emphasize the commonalities that characterize behavior more than the differences that drive heterogeneity. With this orientation, they pose hypotheses that may broadly describe how persons think and act. They use experimental or observational data to test these hypotheses.
In contrast, economists view the study of behavior not as a subject of intrinsic interest but as a means to a practical end, this being to forecast the economic choices that persons would make in specified counterfactual settings. Observing that persons often behave heterogeneously, economists seek to forecast behavior conditional on personal attributes and choice settings. They pose mathematical models of behavior, use data on observed choices to estimate model parameters, and use the estimated models to forecast counterfactual choices.
These disciplinary distinctions do not hold universally but are accurate on the whole. An exception is that much work in experimental economics is similar to work in experimental psychology. Researchers in both fields design and perform experiments to test broad hypotheses about behavior.
To go beyond generalities, I will discuss two aspects of the disconnect between psychology and economics and then consider the sharp conflict about the rationality of human behavior.
Disconnect
A continuing disconnect arises from the difference in the objectives of the disciplines. Whereas psychologists seek to test broad hypotheses about behavior, economists aim to forecast the consequences of alternative public policies or other changes to the environments in which persons act. For example, economists study consumption to forecast the purchases that households would make if they were to face product prices and attributes that differ from those faced in the past. They study schooling choices and labor supply to forecast how these decisions are affected by educational costs, wages, income tax policy, and so on.
Given that quantitative forecasting requires specification and estimation of mathematical models of behavior, the training of PhD economists emphasizes modeling and econometrics. PhD psychologists rarely receive similar training. Hence, psychologists find it difficult to read and understand economic research. The absence of a common research language impedes communication between the disciplines.
An historically important but now less severe disconnect stemmed from differences in the data analyzed by the disciplines. Psychologists have long studied a broad range of data thought to shed light on behavior. These include choices in experimental and observational settings, expectations and other subjective data elicited in response to survey questions, and response times and physiological reactions when persons are asked questions or given choice tasks in experiments. In contrast, economists long based empirical research solely on choice data. Research of this type is called revealed-preference analysis, the name given by Samuelson (2) in his pioneering work; see ref. 3 for an important modern development. Lack of agreement on the types of data that warrant study has impeded communication between psychologists and economists.
The reluctance of economists to study one form of subjective dataprobabilistic expectations-began to diminish in the early 1990s, enabling the collaborations described in ref. 1 . Numerous surveys designed by economists now use probabilistic formats to elicit expectations and a new field of empirical research has emerged. Subjects that have drawn particular attention include expectations of risks that a person faces, future personal income, choices that persons will make, and macroeconomic events. Manski (4) describes the emergence of this field of study and a range of initial applications. Other review articles (5-8) describe work measuring expectations of older persons, inflation, populations in developing countries, and subjects making decisions in laboratory experiments.
Conflict
Turning now from disconnect to conflict, psychologists and economists have long argued the realism of the standard economic assumption that behavior is rational, that is, a person orders alternatives by preference and chooses one ranked highest among those that are feasible. Economists also regularly suppose that a person who has partial knowledge of his choice environment forms probabilistic expectations for unknown quantities and chooses an action that maximizes expected utility.
These assumptions have been controversial. Psychologists and researchers who call themselves behavioral economists have stressed that humans are organisms with limited perceptual and cognitive powers. They assert that humans can at most approximate the type of behavior assumed in economic models. Perspectives have differed on the nature and quality of the approximation.
I have earlier commented on this controversy in ref. 9 . I draw on that discussion here, focusing on the arguments made and the kinds of research performed rather than the specific findings reported. I begin in the middle of the 20th century and move forward.
Economists have asserted that their models of maximizing behavior are successful "as-if" approximations, even if not literal descriptions of decision processes. This assertion was made strongly by Friedman and Savage (10). They defended not just the basic idea of rational choice but the more specific assumptions that persons maximize expected utility and have rational expectations. The term "rational expectations" means that persons have objectively correct probabilistic expectations for future events relevant to decision making. In an often-cited passage, Friedman and Savage argued for the realism of rational expectations by invoking the metaphor of a pool player who can accurately predict the travel of a billiard ball without knowledge of the relevant physics. However, this metaphor has been controversial. A pool player operates in a stable environment with ample opportunity for learning by doing. Rational expectations are less plausible in economic settings that lack this stability and possibility to learn.
Although many economists have found as-if rationality a compelling argument for the assumptions they maintain, others have disagreed. Simon put forward this mission for research on behavior in the article that spawned the field of behavioral economics (ref. 11, p. 99): "Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist."
This notion is called bounded rationality. He went on to suggest that humans suffice with a coarse delineation between satisfactory and unsatisfactory outcomes, an idea called satisficing.
Simon's article neither reported nor cited empirical evidence on actual decision processes. In the absence of evidence, researchers
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with world views as divergent as those of Simon and FriedmanSavage might argue forever with no prospect for convergence. A substantial body of empirical research has accumulated subsequently. The dominant mode of research has been that of experimental psychology, which performs experiments that give subjects specified information and require them to choose among specified actions.
The research program of Tversky and Kahneman (12) has been highly influential within and outside psychology. Early on, they reported experiments on subjective assessments of probability before and after provision of sample data. They found systematic inconsistencies with the correct use of Bayes theorem, a basic principle of probability theory used to integrate new data with prior beliefs. They called these inconsistencies "biases." They concluded that persons tend to use certain heuristics to process data rather than perform the algebra needed to apply Bayes Theorem. They wrote (ref. 12, p. 1124), "In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors." This statement is in the spirit of Simon's bounded rationality.
Kahneman and Tversky (13) reported choice experiments that showed some systematic inconsistencies with the predictions of expected utility theory. They interpreted the observed behavior as demonstrating that persons evaluate actions in terms of gains and loss relative to a reference point rather than in terms of absolute outcomes. They also concluded that persons evaluate gains and losses asymmetrically. They embodied these and other findings in a model called prospect theory. Prospect theory is not a wholesale rejection of economic thinking but rather a revision to expected utility theory to render what the authors believed to be a more accurate description of behavior.
Tversky and Kahneman (14, 15) reported further experiments that explored how behavior depends on the framing of the decision problem, that is, the language a researcher uses to describe the outcomes resulting from alternative actions. They concluded not only that expected utility theory is unrealistic but that behavior is inconsistent with a basic invariance tenet of rational choice, this being that "different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preferences" (ref. 15 , p. S253). Dismissing the core economic idea that persons have stable preferences, they declared that "the normative and the descriptive analyses of choice should be viewed as separate enterprises" (ref. 15 , p. S275). This statement abandoned the Simon view of behavior as a boundedly rational approximation to a rational ideal. It suggested that psychology should go its own way, no longer concerned with the way that economists study behavior.
The experiments reported by Kahneman and Tversky have been replicated often, with similar results. However, this does not imply that one should accept the inferences that the authors drew. Their conclusions that the experiments reveal general features of behavior are huge extrapolations. Some psychologists have joined them in extrapolating from particular experiments to general behavior, but others have not. Multiple review articles (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) describe the variation in perspective across psychologists.
An enormous distance separates the Friedman-Savage contention that as-if rationality well approximates behavior from the Kahneman-Tversky contention that persons lack stable preferences. The common thread in the rhetoric of both sets of authors and their followers has been expression of certitude in their opposing perspectives. Dueling certitudes continue today to characterize much discussion of behavior, which often simplistically debates whether humans are or are not rational.
As an economist whose objective is to forecast counterfactual behavior, I think it more constructive for psychologists and economists to work together to improve our ability to predict substantively important choices in realistic potential choice settings. Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff (1) offer four sensible reasons why their collaborations succeeded. Keeping these reasons in mind should improve the chances for successful future collaborations.
